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What	leads	financial	and	non-financial	firms	to	adopt
corporate	social	responsibility?
In	an	era	when	the	voice	of	customers,	environmentalists	and	other	interest	groups	is	getting	stronger	and	stronger,
corporate	social	responsibility	(CSR)	is	increasingly	adopted	by	firms	and	other	organisations	as	a	strategy	to
reduce	business	risks	and	achieve	results	that	satisfy	both	shareholders	and	stakeholders.
CSR	is	associated	with	a	large	number	of	related	concepts	such	as	business	ethics,	corporate	governance,
accountability,	corporate	citizenship,	sustainability,	etc.	but	its	most	frequent	use	refers	to	the	ESG	(environment,
social	and	governance)	principle.	Not	all	firms	are	equally	willing	to	adopt	the	ESG	principle.	Researchers	assume
that	non-financial	corporations	are	more	likely	to	adopt	“voluntarily”	the	ESG	principle	than	financial	(i.e.,	not
polluting)	firms.
Actually,	there	is	no	theory	that	explains	the	“voluntary”	adoption	of	CSR	by	both	financial	and	non-financial	firms.
The	goal	of	this	blog	post	is	to	explain	and	better	understand	the	current	trend	for	“voluntary”	adoption	of	the	CSR.
Using	recent	advances	in	network	theory	and	regulation,	I	construct	a	multidimensional	conceptual	framework
where	the	interplay	of	networks,	regulation	and	corporations’	shareholders/stakeholders	determine	the	outcome.
Friedman	versus	Freeman	
The	CSR	strategy	is	not	compatible	with	the	neoclassical	view	of	the	firm.	According	to	the	latter,	the	goal	of	a
corporation	is	to	maximise	its	profits	(shareholders’	wealth	maximisation).	Friedman	(1970)	states	explicitly,	“there
is	one	and	only	one	social	responsibility	of	business	–	to	use	its	resources	and	engage	in	activities	designed	to
increase	its	profits…”.	According	to	this	Friedmanesque	view	of	the	firm,	CSR	is	a	“fundamentally	subversive
doctrine”	in	a	free	society	(Ibid,	p.6).
By	contrast,	according	to	the	modern	view	of	the	firm	(Freeman,	1984,	2007	–	chapter	20,	Part	III),	the	objective	of
firms’	managers	is	to	maximise	the	value	of	the	firm	as	a	whole	by	taking	into	account	all	stakeholders’	(individuals
like	employees,	clients,	suppliers,	activists,	etc.)	interests	and	not	solely	the	interests	of	shareholders	(stakeholder
theory).	In	that	sense,	“the	firm	is	a	multilateral	contract	among	its	stakeholders,	and	the	legitimate	moral	claims	of
the	stakeholders	are	justified	in	contractarian	terms”	(Marcoux,	1998,	p.	79).	This	Freemanesque	view	of	the	firm
makes	CSR	an	important	objective	of	firms’	managers.
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Is	it	possible	to	reconcile	these	two	opposing	views	or	do	they	represent	two	extremes	of	both	theory	and	practice?
Polishchuk	(2009)	developed	a	theoretical	framework	to	examine	the	equilibrium	conditions	and	the	optimal	level	of
network	interaction	that	determine	a	corporation’s	decision	to	adopt	the	CSR	principle.	The	latter	is	the	result	of	an
analysis	of	the	costs	and	benefits	of	CSR	and	regulation,	two	institutional	alternatives	in	the	bargaining	between
corporations	and	their	stakeholders.
Luo	and	Bhattaxharya	(2009)	developed	a	theoretical	framework	to	predict	the	impact	of	corporate	social
performance	(CSP)	on	firm-idiosyncratic	risk	and	the	role	of	advertising	and	R&D	in	explaining	the	variability	of
CSP.	The	latter	increases	with	increases	in	marketing	expenses,	contradicting	the	Friedmanesque	point	of	view	on
the	impossibility	to	reconcile	CSR	and	firms’	profitability.	The	reconciliation	of	these	approaches	is	possible	if	one
introduces	the	dynamics	of	active	members	in	the	social	networks.	Using	the	theoretical	framework	I	developed,	I
demonstrate	that	it	pays	for	firms	to	adopt	the	CSR	strategy	whenever	well-organised	social	networks	exert	direct
pressure	on	firms	and/or	on	the	government	to	adopt	regulation	inimical	to	them.
A	comprehensive	theoretical	framework
Network	theory	is	at	the	confluence	of	economics,	sociology	and	computer	sciences.	It	provides	new	opportunities
to	study	and	examine	how	networks	shape	and	determine	the	course	of	key	financial	decisions	and	their
propagation.	Interconnectivity	and	interdependencies	make	them	strong	and	capable	of	exerting	a	great	deal	of
pressure	and	harm	on	corporations	unwilling	to	comply	with	ESG	principles.
To	be	effective,	networks	need	the	so-called	social	capital,	i.e.,	a	capacity	for	self-organisation	and	collective	action
(Keefer	and	Knack,	2003).	Social	capital	is	the	driving	force	for	mobilising	other	network	members	and	exert
pressure	conducive	to	the	adoption	of	CSR	by	targeted	corporations.	The	degree	of	social	capital	depends	on	the
position	of	an	important	member	or	group	of	members	in	the	network.	In	network	theory,	there	are	three	types	of
members:	the	centrally	important,	the	systemically	important	and	the	cyclically	important.	Each	of	them	plays	a	key
role	in	the	creation	of	social	capital.
Networks	use	their	social	capital	to	exert	pressure	on	governments	so	that	they	will	adopt	a	regulation	that
constrains	corporations’	“irresponsible”	behaviour.	It	is	assumed	here	that	corporations	view	regulation	as	an
“economic	bad”	that	constraints	their	behaviour	and	economic	performance.	To	avoid	regulation,	corporations	may
“voluntarily”	adopt	CSR	principles	(see	figure	1).
In	figure	1,	financial	and	non-financial	corporations	have	two	strategies,	either	stay	still	(status	quo)	and	enjoy	a
good	financial	performance	or	choose	the	CSR	principle	as	an	objective	function	and	enjoy	a	good	societal
performance.	Corporations	do	not	choose	the	CSR	voluntarily.	For	this	to	happen	strong	social	capital	is	necessary.
The	higher	the	latter	the	greater	the	effect	of	networks	(stakeholders)	and	the	higher	their	capacity	to	exert	pressure
on	the	firm	to	adopt	the	CSR	principle.	Otherwise,	they	may	persuade	the	government	to	adopt	regulations	that
constraint	corporations	which	do	not	conform	to	the	CSR	principle.	Corporations	would	opt	for	the	CSR	strategy
whenever	regulation	and/or	social	risks	are	costlier	than	the	status	quo	strategy.
Figure	1.	The	interplay	of	networks,	government	regulation	and	corporation’s	shareholders/stakeholders
LSE Business Review: What leads financial and non-financial firms to adopt corporate social responsibility? Page 2 of 4
	
	
Date originally posted: 2020-01-08
Permalink: https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/businessreview/2020/01/08/what-leads-financial-and-non-financial-firms-to-adopt-corporate-social-responsibility/
Blog homepage: https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/businessreview/
Government	intervenes	either	on	its	own	initiative	or	in	response	to	a	network’s	pressure.	Regulation	by	itself	is
undesirable	since	it	imposes	constraints	on	firms’	behaviour	and	performance.	Considered	as	an	“economic	bad”,
firms	would	avoid	regulation	should	the	latter	appear	to	be	more	onerous	than	“voluntary”	adoption	of	CSR.	Social
risk	is	a	real	threat	to	corporations	that	do	not	comply	with	the	CSR	principle.	Failure	to	do	so	would	trigger	action
against	them	by	active	networks	composed	of	systemically	important	stakeholders.
Corporations	are	not	passive	agents.	They	spend	resources	to	influence	active	or	systemically	important	members
either	directly	or	indirectly	using	the	government.	From	a	strategic	perspective,	it	is	possible	for	a	corporation	to
attenuate	the	actions	of	strong	networks	by	targeting	the	most	important	members	(systemically	important	players)
or	persuading	the	government	and/or	the	regulatory	agency	to	provide	incentives	to	players	with	the	highest	cycle
centrality	to	become	less	involved.	When	firms	are	unable	to	remove	a	key	player	from	the	interactive	network,	they
would	prefer	to	adopt	the	CSR	principle	rather	than	accept	regulation.
Perspectives	for	investors,	governments	and	stakeholders
The	conceptual	framework	makes	clear	that	there	is	a	misalignment	of	interests	among	the	various	stakeholders.
Corporations	face	the	dilemma	of	choosing	between	regulation	and	CSR.	From	investors’	perspective,	CSR	is	a
better	option	than	regulation	particularly	when	the	cost	of	regulation	is	higher	than	that	of	CSR.	Corporations	should
work	with	social	networks	(chiefly	with	systemically	important	members)	to	drive	a	positive	reputation	and	improve
their	branding.	Public	relations,	effective	means	of	communication	and	more	marketing	contribute	to	social
acceptability	and	mitigate	social	risk.
Governments	should	also	work	with	the	systemically	important	members	to	assure	that	there	is	a	better	alignment
of	interests	between	opposing	groups.
Systemically	important	network	members	should	also	recognise	their	sheer	influence	on	the	creation	of	social
capital	and	the	impact	it	may	have	on	corporations’	financial	performance.
	♣♣♣
This	blog	post	is	based	on	the	author’s	paper	“Corporate	social	responsibility	and	financial	networks	as	a
surrogate	for	regulation”,	Journal	of	Sustainable	Finance	&	Investment,	Volume	9,	2019.	Issue	3.
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